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Abstract
Voters’ expectations of party strengths are a central part of many foundational
political science theories that posit a strategic act by the voter. But how do voters
develop these beliefs and how is this belief formation affected by polling reports?
In this article, we present a dynamic Bayesian learning model that serves as a
baseline for how beliefs are formed. This also allows us to infer how and when
belief formation deviates from the theoretical ideal. We validate the model and
illustrate its potential based on a number of experiments conducted on MTurk. We
find encouraging results in this pilot study that validate the baseline model.
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1 Introduction
Polls are important sources of political information that shape voters’ beliefs about un-
certain political outcomes: the support for parties, candidates, and policies or the likely
results of elections and referendums. Given the fundamental role of voters’ expectations
in many theories of political science, it is important to understand how citizens process
polling information and if they do so in an optimal way. The recurring ritual of criticizing
polls for failing to predict political outcomes, even if polls perform as expected (Jennings
and Wlezien, 2018), points to the possibility of biased or motivated forms of information
processing (e.g., Bartels, 2002; Taber and Lodge, 2006). To assess this possibility we need
a benchmark of what an ‘optimal’ processing of polling results would look like.
In this paper we propose a Bayesian learning model of how voters (should) learn
from poll results. Bayes’ Rule is widely regarded as the ideal procedure for learning
from political information (e.g. Gerber and Green, 1999; Bartels, 2002; Bullock, 2009;
Sinclair and Plott, 2012; Hill, 2017): current beliefs are a weighted combination of prior
beliefs and new evidence. This model therefore allows us to evaluate and eventually
explain how voters integrate evidence provided by polls and their previously held beliefs.
If voters’ behavior indeed matches the model, they can be said to process the political
information contained in polls in a rational way and the model at hand provides good
explanation of how they do it. Any divergence from the model would still yield important
information because this would indicate that voters’ either have cognitive limitations or
process the polling results in a politically motivated way. Next to a principled way of
forming expectations from poll results and previously held beliefs, the model also provides
a set of key quantities which can be used to further characterize this learning process:
the rate of adaptation to new evidence, the subjective credibility of the poll, and the
discount rate or ‘stickiness’ of prior beliefs.
Using a crowd-sourced online experiment, we randomly instill different prior beliefs
and then sequentially present respondents with three sets of changing polling results
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from a hypothetical two-party electoral race. The evidence from this first experiment
suggests that Bayesian learning provides a reasonable description of how voters adjust
their expectations about the electoral race to new polling information. We find that
while different prior beliefs matter, respondents very quickly adapt to new evidence and
tend to converge in their expectations (yet not completely). In fact, we find that they
give more weight to new evidence than optimal updating based on Bayes’ Rule would
warrant. This suggests that voters are indeed ‘hasty’ Bayesians that move too quickly
and not ‘cautious’ Bayesians as suggested by Hill (2017).
2 Bayesian Learning from Poll Results
Voters who are interested in matters of politics need to learn from available information.
During electoral campaigns, polls are the most readily available source to form beliefs
about the support of political candidates. To understand how polls influence voters’
beliefs, they can be represented by a probability distribution. From a research perspective
those probability distribution encode both the expectation a voter has about the race in
terms of the mean and how certain she is about this conclusion in terms of the variance.
A candidate’s support at a particular point during the campaign, denoted as ✓t, can
theoretically range from 0% to 100%. Voter i ’s belief about it is represented by the
probability distribution pi(✓t). As the belief and thereby the distribution differs between
individuals, the distribution is denoted with i. The question we set out to answer is how
a particular poll yt that publishes a vote share for the candidate influences those beliefs.
Rational voters can use Bayes rule to update their beliefs about a candidate’s support.
After observing the poll each voter can change her belief by conditioning the probability
distribution on the evidence from the poll pi(✓t|yt). Bayes rule states this learning process






In essence, the rule specifies how a voter can revise her belief about the candidate’s
vote share before observing the poll pi(✓t) - which is commonly refereed to as the prior
belief. For this, each voter estimates a subjective likelihood of observing the poll’s result
pi(yt|✓t). It reflects a distribution which – in the eye of the voter – is likely to have
generated the poll. A poll that sees a candidate e.g. at 55% is more likely to result from
a population where 55% instead of 40% support the candidate. p(yt) is the probability
of the poll that normalizes the product of the likelihood and the prior.1 The updated
conditional distribution pi(✓t|yt) is also refereed to as the posterior belief.
2.1 Quantities of interest
Different quantities of the learning process are of interest for researchers. Central is the
question how closely voters will adapt their expectation to the polls. We define this as
the rate of adaption. In particular we are interested how strongly the prior expectation
is shifted in direction of the new evidence. This is sometimes referred to as the delta
rule (see e.g. Nassar et al., 2010). If we denote the expectation of the posterior belief as
µit = E[pi(✓t|yt)] we can write the adaption equation as
µit = µit−1 +  it(yt − µit−1). (2)
In this, the posterior expectation is equal to the prior expectation plus the adaptation
rate  t times the difference between the new evidence and the prior expectation. The
adaptation rate is defined between 0 and 1. 0 means no adaption to the new poll and 1
implies perfect adaption.
In the Bayesian learning model the rate of adaption depends on a number of aspects.
First, how informative a voter perceives the poll to be about the vote share. Relating
survey shares to the support in the population comes with several sources of uncertainty.
Most relevant is the fact that only a limited amount of people are asked about their vote






intention, leaving room for sampling error. The true support can fall within a margin of
error of the poll result. Second, recipients of the poll might consider alternative factors
that lower or increase the information value. For example, they consider the poll as a
forecasting device which means that next to sampling error they expect a forecast error
for the final support. But they could also judge the poll to be more precise in estimating
the true support and mistake the survey as a nearly complete census. All those aspects
can be encoded in the subjective standard deviation of the poll - how voters think that
the true support deviates from the poll result. We can calculate this as the standard




The subjective notation can be compared to the objective standard error of poll.





. In the latter analysis, it is insightful to compare this value to the
subjective standard deviation of the poll.
Second, the rate of adaption depends on how strongly voters carry over their beliefs.
Over an electoral campaign multiple polls will be published, a situation a Bayesian learn-
ing model can accommodate. In essence the posterior belief from the past period can
form the new prior belief that are to be revised in light of the evidence. With this the
question arises how beliefs evolve:
pi(✓t|✓t−1) (4)
Different specification of the process can be used to analyze the evolution process. In
the application here we employ a power discount model (Smith, 1979), which we describe
below. An alternative process could be a random-walk as employed in dynamic linear
learning models.
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2.2 Parametric model of Bayesian Learning from Polls
The analysis of the learning process requires certain assumptions about the probability
distributions that represent voters’ beliefs. We choose a set of flexible distributions that
permit for a conjugate learning process: A Beta-Binomial model.2 This model is well-
suited for our purpose as it permits us to analyze the rate of adaption, the subjective
standard deviation of the poll and the evolution of beliefs.
Again yt defines the share of support for candidate A reported in poll at time t. The
poll is based on a survey of Nt respondents. We assume that the Likelihood function
voters have in mind when evaluating the poll is a binomial distribution p(ytNt|✓t), where
the count of respondents that support that candidate is the product of the poll’s share
and the number of survey respondents. In the current form we assumes that all voters










We further assume that beliefs are beta-distributed. The posterior belief from the
last update p(✓t−1|yt−1) are distributed with ↵it−1,  it−1. Those shape parameters of the












where the discount parameter d specifies how much of the new prior depends on the
2An alternative would be a dynamic linear learning model. However, the bounds of the shares are
better suited to a beta model. In addition, the beta is more flexible in that it permits for non-symmetric
beliefs. A more general form might be found when employing a dynamic generalized linear model, at the
cost of conjugacy.
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past posterior belief. It ranges from 0 to 1, where one means that the beliefs carry over
and 0 that the posterior is not taken into consideration for the new period. Again we
assume a common discount parameter for all learners.







where ↵it = d↵it−1 + ytNt and  it = d it−1 + (1 − yt)Nt are both a function of the
discount parameter, the poll and the prior beliefs. Hence all those aspects shape a voter’s
learning process. To see this more clearly, we can formulate the posterior expectation.
µit =
d↵it−1 + ytNt
d(↵it−1 +  it−1) +Nt
(9)
If the beliefs do not carry over, and d = 0, than the mean expectations are equal
to the poll’s reported share yt. If the survey is relatively small limN→0, the posterior
expectation is dominated by the prior belief expectation as the discount factor cancels
out: αt−1
αt−1+βt−1
. We can also study the rate of adaption, which yields similar results.
Substituting the the expectations in the equation 2 and solving for  t gives:
 it =
(yt↵it−1 + yt it−1 − ↵it−1)Nt
(yt↵it−1 + yt it−1 − ↵it−1)(d(↵it−1 +  it−1) +Nt)
. (10)
Again, if d = 0 the rate of adaption is 1 and the expectations are perfectly adjusted to
the evidence. If the poll is small the rate of adaption tends to towards zero limN→0  it = 0.
3
3At the present state the model does not allow for varying subjective standard deviation of the poll.
As the number of respondents if fixed, the variance of the likelihood is the same for all recipients of the
poll VAR[p(ytNt|θt)] = Ntθt(1 − θt). An alternative could be to allow for individual perceptions of the
sample size by adding a positive constant to the equation: ytNtci. It could be interpreted as scaling
the true sample size up (if above 1) and down if between 0 and 1. This addition would end up in the
calculation of the standard deviation of the poll VAR[pi(yt|θt)] = ciθt(1− θt)
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3 Experimental Set-up
For the purpose of data collection we relied on the crowdsourcing platform Amazon Me-
chanical Turk (MTurk). The main advantages of crowd-sourced experiments are the
relative low cost, the short time needed to arrive at the required responses and the over-
all easy handling. Early on researchers asked whether MTurk can be used to produces
adequate samples and found that it performs quite well when compared to more estab-
lished internet surveys (Berinsky et al., 2012; Mason and Suri, 2012; Thomas and Clifford,
2017).
Recent research shows that treatment effects and treatment heterogeneity can be
estimated adequately in MTurk samples. Coppock (2018) replicates fifteen survey exper-
iments and compares the estimates based on random samples with estimates based on a
MTurk sample. In general, the two sets of estimates overlap. MTurk samples promise to
provide a fast and cost-efficient way to cary out online experiments.
We carried out an initial pilot survey with 300 participants. We follow standard
practice and recruit workers on MTurk with an approval rating of more than 97% and
more than 5000 HIT submissions (but see also Robinson et al., 2019). The median time
for taking the survey was less than 6 minutes and we payed participants 1.10$ to pay the
California minimum wage. We also include an attention check at the end asking for the
color combinations of the plots. In the analyses presented here, we rely on the raw data
and do not apply any weights following the recommendation of Miratrix et al. (2018).
Before describing the structure of the survey in detail, we turn to a fundamental
element of this experiment. How can we elicit respondents’s beliefs? It does not suffice
to ask people what they think is the most likely vote share since that would only provide
the expected value of the distribution (Winkler, 1967) . Throughout the experiment
we rely on a set of questions from Manski (2009). This choice is based on a recent
evaluation study that compares six different prior elicitation methods and shows that
Manski’s set of questions is best suited to elicit prior beliefs (Leemann et al., 2019). The
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Table 1: Manski Prior Elicitation
Question Response
What is the most likely vote share of party A? Please give your
response in percentage points.
bmi
What do you think is a likely range of the vote share that party A
will receive? Please indicate the lower bound in percentage points.
bli
Now, please indicate the upper bound in percentage points. bui
What is the probability that party A will get a vote share of less
than bli percent?
pli
What is the probability that party A will get a vote share of more
than bui percent?
pui
Manski questions, shown below in Table 1, is the only elicitation technique that across
all conditions was able to uncover the objective distribution.
The survey is set in a hypothetical election where party A and party B are competing
with each other. We ask after information updates the same question in the same format.
The first question elicits the expected value, while questions 2 to 5 allow to infer the
variance in an individual belief (Table 1).
Respondents are asked to assess the winning chances of party A in district D. To
start, we need to instill a prior belief before giving respondents the first election poll. To
do so, we present respondents with 100 election outcomes of districts that are similar to
district D (Goldstein and Rothschild, 2014). We do so by relying on a GIF that quickly
shows 100 outcomes – Figure 1 shows four still frames from the GIF.
Figure 1: Four still frames from the GIF. Each still frame is shown for about half a
second. The purple bar at the top is a progress bar.
The GIF exists in two versions. A first version is symmetric and follows a Beta
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distribution with mean at 50% (B(60, 60)). The second version is an asymmetric Beta
distribution with mean at 67% (B(60, 30)). The examples above are from the asymmetric
distribution.
Following the display of of these 100 hundred election outcomes respondents are asked
what their expectation is for a similar district. They are then asked to asked what they
tHink party A’s vote share will be and presented with the five Manski questions. This
allows us to determine their prior before showing them the first polling results. Figure 2
shows how polling results are communicated during the experiment.
Figure 2: Screenshot the three possible information treatments. Respondents are pre-
sented with one plot with polling information in each round.
After showing the respondents a plot based on a poll they are again presented with
the question of how large party A’s vote will be and provided the five Manski questions.
After this they receive two more times a new poll and after each poll they are asked to
respond to the five Manski questions.
The following illustration shows the treatments and the sequence during the experi-
ment.
T1: Respondents are shown GIF with 100 election results.
M1: Respondents’ beliefs are measured.
T2: Respondents are shown an election poll.
M2: Respondents’ beliefs are measured.
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T3: Respondents are shown an election poll.
M3: Respondents’ beliefs are measured.
T4: Respondents are shown an election poll.
M4: Respondents’ beliefs are measured.
T1: Respondents are shown the symmetric distribution showing a close race (50:50)
or an asymmetric distribution showing a one-sided race (67:33). Randomization 1.
T2: Half the respondents receive a poll showing 58:42, the other half receives 51:49.
Randomization 2.
T3: All respondents receive a poll showing 54:46.
T4: Half the respondents receive a poll showing 51:49, the other half receives 58:42.
The polls are hence either starting high and falling or they start low and increase.
Randomization 1 and 2 are independent of each other and this ensures that some peo-
ple receive the first polling information that is close to their prior while others receive
information that is further away. In Table 2 we show the randomization check across a
number of variables and conditions.
Table 2: Balance/Randomization Check
symmetric reverse N female age university polint
1 Non-symmetric Priors Increasing Polls 91 0.50 41.40 0.66 2.72
2 Non-symmetric Priors Decreasing Polls 70 0.40 43.80 0.46 2.82
3 Symmetric Priors Increasing Polls 81 0.55 39.64 0.57 2.75
4 Symmetric Priors Decreasing Polls 100 0.45 41.97 0.64 2.75
In the next section we describe how we estimate the parameters of interest. We then
discuss the empirical results of the pilot study and show how close respondents’ behavior
is to the model.
4 Statistical model using elicited beliefs
In this section we describe a method to estimate the parameters from the parametric
model above from our experiment. In the experimental set-up we measure a set of
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respondents’ i ∈ (1, . . . , R) belief about the vote share of a candidate, every time t ∈
(1, . . . , T ) we present them with a new poll result. We initial the prior beliefs using
sequences of election results (see Figure 1). The prior beliefs are denoted by t = 0.
The beliefs are measured using Manski’s questions. We use the notation described in
Table 1: bmit denotes the expected value, b
l
it the lower bound, b
u
it the upper bound, p
l
it
the probability to observe a value below the lower bound, and puit the probability for the
upper bound. We use the data to estimate the parameters of the model to approximate
how the respondents update their beliefs.
For this, we assume that the observed values for the mean, the lower and upper
bound are measured with normal distributed measurement error for each respondent at
each time point. To keep the measurement model simple, we assume that the same error
variance guides the measured values, and assume that there are no covariances between
the errors:












The expectations are generated from a common belief that follows the description in
subsection 2.2. This belief is assumed to be beta distributed with ↵t and  t as the shape
parameters. One central difference to the theoretical model, here, is that we assume
that all participants hold the same belief, which we consider sensible as we are interested
in learning about the average learning process for different sub-groups. We define the





The expectations for the lower and upper bound are calculated from the CDF of the
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beta beliefs F (x;↵t,  t) using the respective measures of the probability.
µlt = F (p
l
t;↵t,  t) (15)
µut = 1− F (p
u
t ;↵t,  t) (16)
The analytical results from the parametric model identify how the beliefs are revised
and evolve as function of the polls. In this we do not attempt to estimate the beliefs
of each respondent at every time-point instead we are interested in the parameters of
the model. The central parameter is d the discount-rate. And the general prior belief
before the experiment (↵0,  0). The other shape parameters of the respondents beliefs
are defined according to the equations from the learning process:
↵it = d↵it−1 + ytNt
 it = d it−1 + (1− yt)Nt
(17)
With this in mind, we define the log-Likelihood function of the observed measures for
each respondent at each time-point to estimate the average discount parameter and the
prior beliefs. From all respondents’ updating processes we calculate quantities of interest
like the rate of adaption. We define ↵0 = [↵i0, . . . ,↵R0] and  0 = [ i0, . . . ,  R0] as the
vector of all beliefs before the experiment, B as a matrix containing the belief measures of
all respondents at each time-point, and P as the poll results presented to the respondents
at the different time points yt, the sample size Nt. We assume that the observations for
each respondent are independent, which permits us to write the joint log-likelihood:
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l
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The log-likelihood is maximized numerically and results in a estimate of the d and
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the prior beliefs.The evolution of beliefs can be calculated from the results and compared
to the measured quantiles. Of course, this is the most parsimonious model. The only
parameter that defines the learning process is the discount rate. We can make the model
more flexible by assuming individual specific discount rates, adding different perceptions
of the poll’s information value (see Footnote 4), or even imposing a hierarchical structure.
5 Results
In this section we present some preliminary results. The first part shows the descriptive
results, i.e. the survey responses. The second part illustrates the learning model described
in subsection 2.2.
5.1 Descriptive Results
Before estimating the joint statistical learning model described in the section above, we
estimate the average respondent beliefs in the different conditions separately for each time
point. The resulting belief distribution give a descriptive representation of the learning
process. Figure 3 shows the intervals and expectation from the resulting beliefs.4
The Figure highlights three aspects: First, participants clearly update their belief in
direction of the polls. In the case of increasing poll results, the expected support for party
A and B goes up, and vise versa for decreasing support. Second, there can be strong
jumps towards the poll results from the prior beliefs. This is particular pronounced in the
cases, where the prior (about a general race) is not in line with the first poll results. As
an example, in the case of non-symmetric priors and increasing polls, the expectations
form a prior at 66%, the first poll is at 51%. Respondents adopt to the information
from the first poll directly. This also holds for the the scenario with symmetric beliefs
and decreasing polls. Third, participants take the polls at their face-value and update
closely to the poll results. The expectation always aligns closely with the poll results, as
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Figure 3: Respondents’ beliefs about support for party A for different experiential sce-
narios and time-points. The parameters of the beta distributions are estimated for each
time point separately. The bars indicate 99% and 95% coverage of the beliefs, the points
the expectations.
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Figure 4: Respondents’ beliefs about the probability that party A wins more than 50%
of support, for different experiential scenarios and time-points. The parameters of the
beta distributions are estimated for each time point separately.
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An additional pattern is that the effect of priors does not vanish over the three poll
results in our experiment. Figure 4 shows that this can have important implications how
voters perceive the electoral race. It plots the probability that party A has a majority
of support given the estimated beliefs in the electorate for the different scenarios. Of
particular interest is the comparison within participants that received the same polls,
but hold different priors. In the left panel, we plot the probability among participants
who observed increasing poll results for party A. Both groups, those with symmetric and
asymmetric priors, increase their chances that party A will win. But participants with
with symmetric priors, who before the race believed that it’s a close call, take longer
to update. While the difference gets smaller over the time, it persistence even after the
final poll. The same holds for the decreasing poll results, where the participants with
symmetric priors are always less pessimistic that party A will win.
5.2 Results from Learning Model
In this section, we turn to the estimates form our parametric learning model. The results
are reported in the Table below, containing the estimates for the different scenarios. Of
particular interest is the discount factor. We estimate a value of 0.19 and 0.2 for the two
cases in which the priors do not clash with the first poll result (Non-symmetric Priors
and Decreasing Polls, as well as Symmetric Priors and Increasing Polls).
Symmetry Direction ↵0  0    
Non-symmetric Priors Increasing Polls 144.96 125.99 0.00 0.10
Non-symmetric Priors Decreasing Polls 52.41 29.51 0.19 0.09
Symmetric Priors Increasing Polls 35.59 36.00 0.20 0.19
Symmetric Priors Decreasing Polls 52.42 50.89 0.00 0.09
And a discount factor of 0 for the two cases where the first poll stands in contrast
to the prior expectation. A discount factor of zero means that respondents do not carry
over prior beliefs and completely follow the polls to form their updated beliefs. In the
scenarios this might be necessary to accommodate the jump, from the general race to a
particular race, at the beginning. In the other instances, we observe that participants
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consider their priors when updating their beliefs. If this is the case, it takes some time for
the effect of priors to vanish from the belief formation about the race, which can result
in the described patterns above. But even a discount factor of 0.2 implies a high rate of
adaption. For the 0.2 discount factor the rate of adaption is 0.98 which means that the
new expectation is to 98% at the new poll result from the previous belief expectation.
When considering the resulting beliefs from our parametric learning model (which we
show in Figure A2 in the Appendix) it becomes clear that the learning model might not
be flexible enough to accommodate the patterns we have described above. We observe a
clear trend for the belief formation, but compared to the descriptive results, the implied
beliefs after observing the polls are too precise. This is first indication that the learning
model has to be adapted to understand the dynamic learning from poll results. We
discuss some extensions in the Discussion.
6 Discussion
A first application of the dynamic learning model to our experimental data shows that
it works reasonably well in capturing the general pattern of learning. However, certain
aspects have to be adjusted to make the model fit the data better and to further be able
to infer about other quantities of interest form the learning process. At the moment we
only estimate the rate of adaption, but have little to say about the subjective standard
deviation of a poll. In a next iteration we want to adapt the model specification to allow
participants to have different perceptions of the precision of the polls. In addition we
hope to accommodate the first transition from the general priors to the first poll result
more accurately, as this seems to result in different estimates for our learning model.
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Figure A1: Respondents’ beliefs about support for party A for different experiential
scenarios and time-points. The parameters of the beta distributions are estimated for
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Figure A2: Respondents’ beliefs about support for party A for different experiential
scenarios and time-points. The parameters of the beta distributions are estimated from
the learning model. The bars indicate 99% and 95% coverage of the beliefs, the points
the expectations.
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